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FEA TURE ARTICLES
Fax Blasting at the OK Corral: Is the FCC
Shooting From the Hip?
By Brook M. Carey*
Technology is the Wild, Wild West on the legal map. While
other areas of law have developed and become quite civilized,
technology is emerging as the new frontier. As the new frontier of the
legal world, it is often difficult to determine which entities comprise
the good, the bad, and the ugly. One example of a legislative attempt
to extend the long arm of the law over the new frontier is the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA" or "Act") of 1991.1
The TCPA is a comprehensive, federal act that defines prohibited
conduct as it relates to telecommunications, and describes the
available penalties.2
Under the tenets of federal preemption and the language of
the TCPA, states may modify their version of the Act as long as it is
as least as restrictive as the TCPA.3 However, a violation of a state
statute is separate from a violation of the TCPA.4 Because a single
*

Brook M. Carey is an associate attorney with the law firm of Cassiday

Schade LLP in Naperville, Illinois, where she focuses her practice in general
liability defense, breach of contract litigation, and medical malpractice defense. She

is a 2003 graduate of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).
2 See id.

3 See id. § 227(e)(1)(A) (stating that "[e]xcept for the standard prescribed
under subsection (d) of this section and subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection,
nothing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shall
preempt any State law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or
regulations ... ").
4 See id. § 227(f)(6) (stating that "[n]othing contained in this subsection shall
be construed to prohibit an authorized State official from proceeding in State court
on the basis of an alleged violation of any general civil or criminal statute of such
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violation of the TCPA may serve as the basis for two causes of
action-one under state and one under federal law-it is important to
discuss both the federal Act and the applicable state statutes. Both
laws may come into play because the unusual text of the TCPA
provides that state courts
have exclusive jurisdiction for private rights
5
of action under the Act.
This paper will first analyze the pertinent provisions of the
TCPA. It will then discuss the constitutional challenges leveled
against the Act under the First, Fifth and Eighth Amendments as well
as the Equal Protection Clause. Next, it will examine difficulties in
the class action setting and conclude that a class action suit is an
inappropriate tool to use to enforce the Act. Finally, this article will
make some suggestions for the reformation of the Act such that it
yields a greater benefit to both consumers and businesses.

Introduction

I.

The fax machine was once considered an oddity, but its
presence has now become rather commonplace and benign, although
its function is essential for most businesses. In fact, Congress has
recognized that, "the facsimile machine is a primary tool for
business..." 6By 1991, over thirty billion pages were transmitted by
fax each year.7 Unfortunately, as the popularity of facsimile machines
has risen, so too has the prevalence of unsolicited facsimile
advertising.8
Unsolicited facsimile advertising, commonly known as junk

State.")
5 Id. See also Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium
Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 435-38 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing jurisdictional aspects
of the TCPA).
6 See Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 377
(Tex. App. 2004). In Chair King, the recipients of unsolicited fax advertisements
sued seeking private damages under the TCPA, along with claims for common law
negligence, invasion of privacy, trespass to chattels, gross negligence, negligence
per se, and civil conspiracy. See id. at 370-71. The trial court granted defendant's
motions for no-evidence summary judgment and traditional summary judgment.
See id. at 371-72. Plaintiffs appealed and the appellate court held that the TCPA
applied to interstate faxes, did not violate the Commerce Clause, did not violate
Due Process, did not violate Equal Protection, and did not violate the First
Amendment. See id. at 396-97.
'

See id.

8 See id.
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or mass faxing, is a $300 million per year industry. 9 Mass faxing is
beneficial in industries such as pharmaceutical sales and travel
agencies.' 0 Mass faxing also provides a cost-effective way for small
businesses to advertise on equally small marketing budgets." As the
success of this advertising medium developed, "fax blasting"
corporations also began to emerge. These corporations are normally
hired by small businesses that pay pennies per fax.' 2 While fax
blasting companies vary in their levels of involvement, they generally
obtain materials that an entity wishes to "fax blast" and then actually
transmit the material to a list of fax numbers that the company has
either compiled itself, or that has been provided by the advertising
entity.
Although a seemingly foolproof and incredibly cheap
modicum of advertising to the masses, the Act has caused some high
profile corporations to pay significant damages for taking part in "fax
blasting". For example, in 2001, a Georgia appellate court ordered a
Hooters restaurant to pay almost $12 million in damages for sending
unsolicited faxes through a telemarketing company.' 3 In addition, the
Attorney Generals in several states have recently sued under this
statute. 14 In August, 2002, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") fined Fax.com $5.3 million for violations of the TCPA. 15
Following that judgment, a $2.2 trillion lawsuit was filed in
California by entrepreneur Steve Kirsch against Fax.com.16 Although
the suit is still pending, Fax.com is no longer in operation due to the
tremendous sanctions and fines levied against it as a result of TCPA
9 Jeremiah Marquez, Lawsuits Threaten to Unplug Junk Fax Industry (Sept. 6,
2003),
http://www.detnews.com/2003/technology/0309/07/technology263719.htlm.
10

See id.

'l See id.
12

See id.

13 See Marquez, supra note 9 (citing Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson,

537 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). According to the plaintiffs attorney, this
judgment was reduced to $9 million per a settlement agreement. See id.
14 See id. It should also be noted that under the terms of the TCPA, actions
brought by states have proper jurisdiction only in federal courts because, by
definition, they are not private rights of action. See id. § 227(f)(2) (stating that, "the
district courts of the United States.. .shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all civil
actions brought under this subsection", referring to actions brought by States.)
15

See Marquez, supra note 9.

16

See id.
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violations. "
Illinois is becoming a hotbed for TCPA litigation, and is
focusing more heavily on the facsimile provisions.' 8 In Cook County
alone, a single judge has presided over more than one hundred TCPA
suits. In its attempt to curb the influx of unsolicited facsimiles, the
FCC has levied almost 200 citations and fines since 1999.20
The law against fax blasting has also garnered national
attention due to the wide net the statute spreads in terms of who may
properly be named a defendant. While it is clear that the "fax blaster"
is liable for the faxes it sends in violation of the Act, various
interpretations of the statute have also placed liability on other
entities. Specifically, agency theory can play an important role in
deciding who may be named a defendant. 2' For example, if a fast
food franchise performs a "fax blast" to advertise the particular
franchise, the parent fast food corporation may also be implicated,
even if that entity had absolutely no knowledge of the activities of the
individual franchisees. Under certain circumstances, common
carriers, which provide the telephone lines and means of transmission
23
for facsimiles,2 can also be held accountable under the Act.
Basically, any party associated with the "fax blaster" or the company
that is advertised faces potential liability under the Act, as it may be
argued 24that the facsimile was sent either by the party or on its
behalf.

II.

Evolution and Current Status of the TCPA

The law has struggled to find a way to govern this new
frontier. In support of the Act, the legislature clearly stated why such
17

Craig Anderson, Executive Fights Faxes, One at a Time, Los

DAILY J., June
18 Walter

ANGELES

6, 2005, at 3.
Olson,

Land of Junk Fax Lawsuits, (Dec.
http://www.overlawyered.com/archives/001811 .html.

15,

2004),

'9 See id.
20

See id.

21 See Worsham v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 772 A.2d 868, 877-79 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2001) (discussing liability for actions performed by independent contractors).
22 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).

23

Texas v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 121 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1089 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Communs., 329 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 805-07 (D. La. 2004).
24
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5

legislation is necessary. The Congressional Findings contained in the
Public Act pre-dating the TCPA state that, "Individuals' privacy
rights, public safety interests, and commercial freedoms of speech
and trade must be balanced in a way that protects the privacy of
individuals and permits legitimate telemarketing practices. ' 25 From
1989 to 1991, Congress considered various measures to address these
new mediums made possible by technological innovations.2 6 The
TCPA was therefore the result of an evolving body of law calculated
27
to put an end to this telemarketing technique. 7 Initially, states began
passing their own legislation to address this issue. 28 However, state
laws had a limited effect because they did not have jurisdiction over
interstate calls, and therefore did not govern facsimiles sent
.
interstate 29
The rationale for the Act is based on the inconvenience and
costs to the fax recipients, including the cost of paper and toner, as
well as wear and tear on the facsimile machines. 3 In addition, courts
also cite to abstract damages such as the potential loss of business
when facsimile machine lines are tied up, and the medical
emergencies that could be exacerbated as a result of the use of
facsimile lines. 31 Because of the cost shifting consequences of
practice itself is sometimes
unsolicited fax advertisements, the
32
referred to as "advertising by theft.
Generally speaking, Congress enacted the TCPA because of
the public outrage over unsolicited telemarketing. 33 As a New York

25

Pub.L. 102-243 (9) codified as 47 U.S.C.A. 227 (West 2005).

26

Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d365, 376 (Tex.

App. Ct. 2004).
27

See id. (stating that the TCPA combined various aspects from three previous

bills).
See id. (discussing the movement in New York by state official Richard
Kessel which began after he was unable to fax a document to the governor's office
because the fax lines were tied up by a junk fax., "The last thing you want when
you're trying to meet a deadline, or trying to get a memo to your boss.., is to be
disturbed by someone trying to sell draperies or submarine sandwiches.").
29 See id.
28

30 Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
31 See id. See also In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 17 F.C.C.R. 17459 (2002).
32 Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
33 See Rudgayzer & Gratt v. LRS Commns., Inc. 776 N.Y.S.2d 158, 164 (N.Y.
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court noted in Rudgayzer & Gratt v. LRS Commissions, Inc., "those
who complain about these calls believe that they are a nuisance and
an invasion of privacy. Residential and business subscribers
34 believe
that these calls are an impediment to interstate commerce."
Congress has also identified a two-fold governmental interest
in the Act. The first interest is that "unsolicited junk faxing shifts
advertising costs from the advertiser to the recipient." 35 The second is
that "unsolicited fax advertising occupies a recipient's facsimile
machine so that the recipient cannot utilize it for his or her desired
purpose. 36
The movement against "fax blasting" as a legal means of
advertising quickly, gained such momentum that even organizations
37
such as the ACLU joined in the call for protective legislation.
ACLU general counsel Janlori Goldman spoke to the House
Subcommittee 38 formed to address the issue, stating that "we...
support the.., limits on fax machines, in terms of sending
unsolicited advertising. We think that because of the burden that is
placed on the individual who has to pay for the cost of
communication, that that then justifies [a] broader ban [than that
placed on telephone solicitation]. 39
The House Report also distinguished the treatment of
advertisements transmitted via facsimile from other mediums. 40 The
report noted that when junk mail is sent, the recipient pays nothing to
receive the advertisement. 41 On the other hand, when an
advertisement is sent via facsimile, the recipient pays for the ink and
the fax paper.42 A federal district court explained the difference by
stating that when people are exposed to advertisements via the
Civ. Ct. 2003).
34 See id.

Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F.Supp. 2d 920, 928 (E.D. Mo. 2002),
rev'd, 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
35

36 Id.

Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d365, 377 (Tex.
App. Ct. 2004).
38 The formal name is the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
of the House Commission on Energy and Commerce. Id.
37

39 Id.
40

See H.R.REP. No. 102-317, at 25 (1991).

41 See id.
42

See id.
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newspaper or television it is because they have voluntarily opened the
newspaper or turned on the television; in contrast, there is no
voluntary act associated with the receipt of a facsimile
advertisement.43
The legislative history of the Act also provides insight on
whether the Act was meant to be enforced via a class action. Senator
Ernest Hollings of South Carolina was the sponsor of the TCPA in
1991.44 While promoting the Act, Senator Hollings stated:
[t]he bill does not, because of constitutional constraints,
dictate to the States which court in each State shall be the
proper venue for such an action, as this is a matter for State
legislators to determine. Nevertheless, it is my hope that
States will make it as easy as possible for consumers to
bring such actions, preferably in small claims
court ....
Small claims court or a similar court would allow
the consumer to appear before the court without an
attorney. The amount of damages in this legislation is set
forth to be fair to both the consumer and the telemarketer. I
thus expect that the States will act reasonably in permitting
their citizens to go to court and enforce the bill.45
Despite Senator Hollings "hope" that the actions be brought
in small claims court, class actions for TCPA violations abound.
Based on the rationales outlined above, the TCPA was enacted was
signed into law on December 20, 1991. 4 6.
A. Illegal Conduct
i.

Under the Federal Act
The TCPA provides that it is illegal "to use any telephone

Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
44 See Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d at 302.
The recipients of facsimile
advertisements brought class actions against defendant corporations for TCPA
violations. Id. The court found that the TCPA was constitutional and that while
violations could be brought as class actions, recipients did not have private rights of
action in state court. Id.
43

45

id.

See Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 377
(Tex. App. Ct. 2004).
46
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facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited
advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine. 4 7 In addition, the
Act requires that, "all faxes clearly display of the first page or each
page (a) the date and time of the transmission, (b) the identity of the
sender, and (c) the telephone number of the sender or sending fax
machine., 48 If the fax is sent by a third party service (i.e. a "fax
blaster"), then both the author of the text and the service must be
identified.49
The TCPA only prohibits unsolicited advertising.5 ° Moreover,
it does not impose liability for the distribution of non-commercial
faxes, which include job opportunity advertising and political faxes. 51
These exceptions from liability are often justified by the fact that
commercial speech is afforded a lower level of First Amendment
protection. 52 The TCPA's legislative history also specificallIy
supports the disparate treatment of the different types of facsimiles.
The regulations define "telephone facsimile machines" as "equipment
which has the capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from
paper into an electronic signal over a regular telephone line, or to
transcribe text or images (or both) from an
54 electronic signal received
paper.",
onto
line
telephone
over a regular
The FCC has further defined an "unsolicited advertisement"
as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of

48

47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).
See id.

49

See id.

4'

50 See id.
5 The exception from liability that exists for all non-advertising facsimiles is
justified under the notion that commercial speech is afforded a lower level of
protection under the First Amendment than other forms of speech. Missouri v. Am.
Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F.Supp. 2d 920, 929 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 323 F.3d 649 (8th
Cir. 2003). A much more comprehensive discussion of this appears in Part III
addressing constitutional challenges.
52 See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc.,_323 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 2003) ,

rev'g, 196 F.Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
" 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005). The Congressional findings accompanying
the TCPA state that "[t]he Constitution does not prohibit restrictions on commercial
telemarketing solicitations." Furthermore, in regards to telephone calls, but with
reasoning equally applicable to the facsimile provisions, Congress found that while
all calls were a nuisance, the FCC should have flexibility in proscribing regulations
consistent with the free speech protections contained in the First Amendment.
14

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2003).
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any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person
without that person's prior express invitation or permission."55 Under
the FCC interpretations, permission to send a facsimile advertisement
does not arise simply because someone requests, and is given, a fax
number.56 Furthermore, a sender cannot claim permission on the
basis of a fax which places an affirmative burden on the recipient to
notify the sender in order to opt-out of receiving future faxes. 5 7 In
addition, publishing a fax number or handing out a business card that
contains a fax number does not constitute the necessary express
invitation or permission. 58
Fax senders have been afforded some protection under the
"Established Business Relationship" ("EBR") exception. 59 The EBR
exception developed as a result of the FCC's interpretation of the
term "unsolicited." 60 A fax sender using the EBR exception may
argue that they had "permission" to fax the advertisement.'
Permission to fax is presumed to exist if the sender can prove the
existence of an EBR with the recipient.62 The FCC's order of June
26, 2003, states that:
[t]he term established business relationship means a prior
or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way
communication between a person or entity and a residential
subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration, on
the basis of the subscriber's purchase or transaction with
the entity within the eighteen (18) months preceding the
date of the telephone call or on the basis of the subscriber's
inquiry or application regarding products or services
offered by the entity within the three months immediately
preceding the date of the call, which relationship has not be

5 See id..
About
Junk
Faxing,
Asked
Questions
56 See
Commonly
http://www.junkfax.org/fax/basic-info/junk-fax-qa.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
51 See id.
58 See id.

59 See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 19 F.C.C.R. 20125 (2004).
60 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(0(3) (2005).
61

See id.

62

See id.
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63
previously terminated by either party.

Although facsimile senders were warned that the EBR
liability exception would expire on January 1, 2006, on July 9, 2005,
the President signed an amendment to the TCPA known as the Junk
Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which reaffirms the EBR exception 64 As
a result, the
EBR will continue to exist as long as this statute remains
65
good law.
ii. Pre-emption discussion and survey of state enactments
As noted earlier, based on the doctrine of pre-emption, states
are free to enact their own version of the TCPA as long as the state
statute is at least as restrictive as the Act. 66 For example, in
Louisiana, there is a statute called the Unsolicited Telemarketing Act
("UTMA"). 67 This statute virtually mirrors the language contained in
the TCPA, and allows for statutory penalties between $200- $500 per
facsimile, as well as for costs and attorney's fees that are not
provided for under the TCPA.68 As these are penalties under a
separate statute, they are in addition to any damages that may be
assessed under the TCPA.
Taking advantage of the express permission to enact its own
regulatory statute, Illinois has also codified its own version of the
TCPA. 69 This section states in pertinent part that:
[n]o person shall knowingly use a facsimile machine to
send or cause to be sent to another person a facsimile of a
document containing unsolicited advertising or fund-raising
material, except to a person which the sender knows or

63

See id.

64

47 U.S.C. § 609 (2005).

65

See id.

See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(1)(A) (stating that "[e]xcept for the standard
prescribed under subsection (d) of this section and subject to paragraph (2) of this
subsection, nothing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section
shall preempt any State law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or
regulations...").
67 See LA.REv.STAT. Ann. §§ 51:1745 - 1746 (2005).
66

68

See Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commns.,

L.P., 329 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D. La. 2004).
69 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-3 (2005).
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under all of the circumstances reasonably believes has
given the sender permission, either on a case by case basis
or a continuing basis, for the sending of such material.7 °
The penalty provision of the Illinois statute makes a violation
of this section a petty offense and allows for a fine of up to $500.71 In
Illinois, this violation constitutes a crime, and not a civil action; thus,
it cannot be brought by a private citizen.72 Therefore, in Illinois, the
TCPA is the sole means for a private citizen to seek redress for the
receipt of unwanted facsimiles. 3
B. Penalty Provisions
The TCPA allows for a $500 per violation (i.e. per fax)
penalty. 74 This amount may be increased to $1,500 per violation if
the court finds that the sender willfully or knowingly violated the
Act.75 The Act has been interpreted to mean that each separate page
of a facsimile is a separate violation. 7 6 In addition as discussed
below, the Act is one of joint and several liability, 77 meaning that
several parties may be held responsible for a single fax. The
Congressional history reflects that "[t]he drafters recognized that
damages from a single violation would ordinarily amount to only a
few pennies worth of ink and paper usage, and so believed that the
$500 minimum damage award would be sufficient to motivate private

70

See id.

71 See
72

id.
See id. (The statute is contained in the Illinois criminal code).

The TCPA is basically the only means for private citizens to seek redress
for receiving facsimiles in violation of the TCPA because a theoretical alternative,
a conversion claim in tort, has not been decided in any published opinion by Illinois
courts. However, because in Illinois, the tort of conversion affords only actual
damages, a great influx of conversion complaints based on the receipt of
unsolicited facsimiles is unlikely. See Ruiz v. Wolf, 621 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1981)). See also, Charles Selon & Assocs., Inc. v. Aisenberg's Estate, 431
N.E.2d 1214 (I11.
App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the "[gleneral rule in conversion
action is that damages are set at date of conversion").
74 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).
73

75 Id.
76 See
Commonly
Asked
Questions
About
Junk
Faxing,
http://www.junkfax.org/fax/basic-info/junk-fax-qa.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
77 See id.
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redress of a consumer's grievance through a78relatively simple small
claims court proceeding without an attorney."
C. Designation of Parties Under the TCPA
An interesting and complex issue is who can sue and who can
be sued under the TCPA. Technically, it is the receiver of the fax that
has the standing to sue. 79 This can create complex issues in a
corporate setting which have yet to be answered. For example,
because statutory violations of the TCPA are considered tortious,
both the company and the individuals involved in sending the fax can
be held liable.0 Additionally, issues involving the liability of
independent contractors and common carriers have resulted in
complicated decisions.
D. Independent Contractor Liability
One of the issues that is most difficult to rationalize is the role
that the doctrine of respondeat superior plays in the Act. This
doctrine is somewhat inconsistent with the near strict liability
language found in the Act. Under the TCPA, the sender is almost
always liable; there is no intent requirement. 8' In contrast, the
doctrine of respondeat superior provides that a principal is only
liable for the acts of his agent when
they are within the scope and
82
nature of the agent's employment.
The problem with applying agency law in fax blasting cases is
that frequently there is a party that acts as a middle man and brokers
services for another corporation. In that capacity, the party acting as a
middle man may or may not be considered an agent, depending on
the specific facts of the case.
For instance, a restaurant may pay a fee to have its menu and
carry out services included in an advertising publication published by
a small, for-profit corporation. If the publishing group hires a
marketer to publicize various restaurant menus and the marketer hires
a "fax blaster" to send faxed menus to unsolicited customers, the
78

See 137 CONG. REC. S16204-01, 16205-06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).

'9 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).
80 See
Commonly
Asked
Questions
About
Junk
Faxing,
http://www.junkfax.org/fax/basic-info/junk-fax-qa.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
81 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).
82

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219, Cmt. a (1958).
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restaurant may be liable under the TCPA, even if it had no
knowledge of the faxes.
Several cases emphasize that a defendant can be held liable
under the TCPA even if they are not personally responsible for
sending the fax. 83 Instead, as the Maryland Supreme Court noted in
Worsham, "in the context of a damage action under 47 U.S.C. §
227(c)(5) ... defendant still can be liable, even if independent
contractor made the call on defendant's behalf., 84 In Worsham, the
plaintiff received two unsolicited telephone calls advertising the
services of Nationwide Insurance and sued under the "do not call"
provisions of the TCPA. 85 The first telephone call was placed by a
Nationwide insurance agent. 86 Nationwide contended that it was not
liable under the TCPA for this call on the basis of an agency
agreement between the insurance agent and Nationwide because the
insurance agent was an independent contractor. 87 The trial court held
that the placing of the call by the independent contractor insurance88
agent did not constitute a valid cause of action against Nationwide.
Worsham appealed, and the appellate court held that "the existence of
an independent contractor relationship between Nationwide and [the
insurance agent], would not, in itself, insulate Nationwide from
liability under the TCPA. ' 89 The court further stated that the TCPA
reaches not only the entity actually making the solicitation, but also
the entity on whose behalf the solicitation is made. 90 Specifically, the
court held that a principal can be liable for the solicitations of an
independent contractor who makes the solicitation at the direction
and request of the principal. 91
In another case, although a Georgia appellate court ultimately
83

Worsham v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 772 A.2d 868, 877-79 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. 2001).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 id.
87

Id. at 871.

88 Id.
89

Id. at 878. However, an unanswered question remains regarding whether the

status of a party as an independent contractor coupled with the fact that a facsimile
was not sent on its behalf, would be sufficient for the independent contractor to
escape liability. Id.
90 Id.

91 Id.
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determined that the issue of whether the sender of the facsimile was
an independent contractor was a question of fact for the jury, it did
Vrovide the trial court with some guidance for its analysis on remand.
2 The Court advised that even if the jury were to find
that the
facsimile sender was an independent contractor, the company could
still be liable under the TCPA based on the FCC interpretation that
the entity
on whose behalf the facsimile was sent is ultimately
93
liable.
The foregoing examples illustrate that liability under the
TCPA can be imputed to several parties, and often for the same
facsimile. Common carrier liability is another avenue used by
plaintiffs to collect damages from a party other than the specific
transmitter of the facsimile.
E. Common Carrier Liability
Under the current law, common carriers generally cannot be
held liable for faxes sent using their lines. 94 In the context of the
TCPA
facsimile
provisions,
common
carriers
are the
owners/providers of the lines of communication over which the
facsimiles are sent.95 However, 96under limited circumstances, a
common carrier can be held liable. In a recent report accompanying
the regulations, the FCC specifically drew a line of liability between
the "fax broadcasters" (i.e. common carriers) and the "fax
advertisers" (i.e. the authors of the fax), stating that:
[p]arties commenting on the facsimile requirements for
senders of facsimile messages urge the Commission to
clarify that carriers who simply provide transmission
facilities that are used to transmit others' unsolicited
facsimiles may not be held liable for any violations of [the
regulations]. We concur with these comment[s]. In the
92

See Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E.2d 468, 472 (Ga. Ct.

App. 2000)..
93 Id.

In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 17 F.C.C.R. 17459 (2002) (noting that the FCC
found that "in the absence of a 'high degree of involvement or actual notice of an
illegal use and failure to take steps to prevent such transmissions,' common carriers
will not be held liable for the transmission of a prohibited facsimile message.").
94

95 Id.
96

Id.
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absence of 'a high degree of involvement or actual notice
of the illegal use and failure to take steps to prevent such
for
transmissions,' common carriers will not be held liable
97
message.
facsimile
prohibited
a
of
transmission
the
Therefore, for a common carrier to be liable under the Act,
they generally must have some involvement other than simply
supplying the technical means to send the fax. 98 For example, liability
could potentially result if the common carrier was involved in
creating any of the substantive content of the fax, or, more
99
commonly, if they assisted in developing the telephone number list.
In 1995, the FCC again addressed the issue of common carrier
liability, stating that "the entity or entities on whose behalf facsimiles
are transmitted are ultimately liable for compliance with the rule
banning unsolicited facsimile advertisements, and that fax
broadcasters are not liable for compliance with this rule."' 100 This
interpretation is consistent with the TCPA's legislative history, and
not be
with our findings in the Report and Order that carriers will
1
held liable for the transmission of a prohibited message."'

III. The Constitutionality of the TCPA
The majority of courts faced with constitutional challenges to
the Act have rejected such claims, with the exception of the court in
Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc.102 However, as the proliferation
of litigation becomes more widespread and class actions are utilized
more often to raise the potential damage awards, an increase in the
number of constitutional challenges is inevitable. This likelihood of
additional constitutional challenges is further increased by the rise in

Kaufnan v. ACS Sys., Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. at 8779-80 (1992)).
98 See id.
97

99 In the Matter of Rules
Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
'00 In the Matter of Rules
Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
101Id.

and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
17 F.C.C.R. 17459 (2002).
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
10 F.C.C.R. 12391 (1995).

See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920, rev'd, 323 F.3d
649 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the provision of the TCPA prohibiting unsolicited
advertisements violated the First Amendment right of free speech).
102
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volume of class actions leading to enormous damages awards. In
addressing constitutional arguments, the courts must give deference
1°3
to Congress' findings out of respect for its legislative power.
A. First Amendment Concerns
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees free speech. 10 4 However, this right is not absolute, and
therefore in certain contexts the government may place limitations on
speech to protect other rights.' 0 5 For example, the government may
impose greater restrictions on commercial speech, keeping in mind
that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are
suspect, precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms' ... forgiving standard

for restrictions on commercial speech, a State may not curb protected
10 6
expression without advancing a substantial governmental interest."
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was the
only court to uphold a constitutional challenge against the TCPA
when the defendant's arguments were rooted in the First
Amendment. 1° 7 In Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc, the court
noted that while the Supreme Court will generally allow restrictions
on speech content in only the most extreme circumstances, contentbased restrictions on commercial speech are permissible. 08 The court
noted that in analyzing a constitutional challenge based in the First
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has stated that:
[e]ven in the realm of First Amendment questions where
Congress must base its conclusions upon substantial
evidence, deference must be accorded to its findings as to
the harm to be avoided and to the remedial measures
adopted for that end, lest we infringe on traditional
legislative authority to make predictive judgments when

103 Kaufman, 2

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313.

104

See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

105

See Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313 (stating that "the Court has afforded

commercial speech a measure of First Amendment protection 'commensurate' with
its position in relation to other constitutionally guaranteed expression).
106 Id. at 314.
107

See Am. Blast Fax,Inc., 196 F. Supp 2d at 934.

0'8 See id. at 927.
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09
enacting nationwide regulatory schemes.'

The court held that the proper test to determine the
constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech is one of
intermediate scrutiny, as described in Central Hudson v. Public
Services Commission of New York." 0 This test has been described as
follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted government interest is substantial. If
both inquires yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.'
In applying this test, the court noted that the expressions
involved in unsolicited faxes are afforded some protection under the
First Amendment in that faxing advertisements is generally a lawful
activity and is not misleading. 1 7 The court then analyzed whether the
government had the requisite substantial interest, stating that "[a]
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real. This

109Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
110 See Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (citing Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). In
Central Hudson, an electrical utility sued the State of New York to challenge the
constitutionality of a regulation which completely banned the utility from being
able to advertise. Central Hudson, 447 U.S.. at 559. The regulation was upheld by
the trial court and the intermediate appellate court and was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which held that the regulation was unconstitutional, based
on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, in that the state's asserted interest and the
link between the advertising prohibition was not sufficient, and that the regulation
was more restrictive than necessary. Id. at 558.
...Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
112 See id. at 926-27. See also Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d
296, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that plaintiffs in that case contended that the
sending of unsolicited facsimiles gave rise to a cause for trespass to chattels and
therefore was not a lawful activity and therefore was not entitled to any degree of
First Amendment protection). The court noted that in Intel Corp v. Hamidi, 71
P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003), the California Supreme Court held that such activities do not
give rise to an action for trespass to chattels. Id.
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burden cannot be satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture."'1 13 The
court specifically noted that it was clear from the legislative history
that Congress did not consider studies or empirical data estimating
the costs. Additionally, the court noted that the government did not
distinguish between unsolicited faxes that violated the TCPA and
those that the TCPA permitted." 5
The court further stated that the government had not provided
the requisite level of proof needed to show a true "substantial
interest."' " 6 However, the court's analysis did not end there. The
court stated that the government would not be able to satisfy the
second prong of the Central Hudson test: whether 7the regulation
directly advanced the governmental interest asserted."
Additionally, the court held that the government would not be
able to prove that the restrictions would alleviate the harm caused by
the transmission of these facsimiles to a material degree," 8 citing to
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. in support.
In
Discovery Network, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld a prohibition on
the distribution of commercial handbills, but allowed the distribution
of other "non-commercial" handbills.' 20 The Supreme Court held that
the benefits received were not sufficient, nor a proper "fit," to be
considered constitutional.
The Supreme Court stated that the
distinction between the commercial and non-commercial handbills
was not at all 22related to the purported interests of the City in safety
and esthetics.
A Missouri district court held that the Act was

113

Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp 2d at 928.

114

See id. at 929.

115 See id. at 932. For example, the government did not present any evidence
regarding how may were protected political or job opportunity faxes as opposed to
impermissible advertising faxes. See id.
116 Seeid. at 931.
117

See id.

See id. The Court noted that the harm was two-fold: 1) the cost shifting
effect, and 2) the occupation of a recipient's facsimile machine. Id.
119 See Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp 2d at 933 (citing City of Cincinnati v.
118

Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993)).
120 See Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 412-14.
121

See id. at 428.

122

See id. at 410.
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unconstitutional because the regulation was more extensive than
necessary.123 The court made much of the fact that the TCPA only
banned unsolicited advertisements as opposed to all unsolicited
faxes. 124 The success of this constitutional challenge was short lived.
This case was subsequently reversed by the Eighth Circuit. 125 The
court stated that Central Hudson was the proper test for determining
the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech. 126 Based
on the legislative history of the TCPA, it found that there was a
substantial
interest
in
restricting
unsolicited
facsimile
advertisements.' 27 The court also distinguished the Supreme Court's
decision in Discovery Network, Inc., stating that in American Blast
Fax, Inc., the disparate treatment was indeed related to the asserted
governmental interest, which was not the case in Discovery
Networks.128 The appellate court agreed that the distinction was
justified. 129 It held that advertisers can still utilize any legal means,
and that the statute was narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective. 3 ' The court explained that the ban was not intended to
protect the public from the content of the speech, or to implement
policy unrelated to the delivery of the message itself.13 1 Noting that
the TCPA has not eliminated the facsimile machine as a potential
channel for communication, it stated that the Act merely requires that
the sender obtain prior permission. 32
Although subsequently reversed, the reasoning espoused by
the district court in American Blast Fax, Inc. has been used
1 33
repeatedly, albeit unsuccessfully, by defendants in TCPA cases.
123

See Am. Blast Fax Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d at 932.

124

See id. at 933.

See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc.,_323 F.3d 649, 653 ( 8th Cir. 2003),
rev'g, 196 F.Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
126 See id. at 653 (noting that under CentralHudson, if the commercial speech
is not unlawful or misleading, it must be determined whether "the asserted
governmental interest is substantial).
125

127

See id.at 655.

128

Id. at 656.

129

See id.at 655.

130

See id.at 659.

131 id.
132 id.
133

See Rudgayzer & Gratt v. LRS Cormns., Inc., 193 Misc. 2d 449, 454
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All other courts faced with the issue have held the TCPA
constitutional. 134 The majority of these courts explained their
decision by stating that the Act is a reasonable means to halt the
shifting of advertising costs to consumers. 35 In doing so, courts state
that "Congress's interests in passing the TCPA-preventing
'unwitting customers' from bearing the brunt of advertising costs and
preventing
unwanted fax machine interference-are substantial and
136
,

real."

Naturally, the requirement that the Act materially advance a
substantial interest is easily met in that the ban on unsolicited faxes
seeks to stop the harm that is allegedly caused by the receipt of such
facsimiles. Past defendants have argued that the TCPA does not
materially advance any substantial government interest; essentially
asserting that the means are under inclusive because the statute still
allows non-advertising junk faxes to be freely transmitted, including
job postings and political announcements.' 37 However, the
Destination Ventures court quickly rejected this argument, stating
that Congress's goal was to prevent the shifting of advertising costs,
and therefore that limiting regulations
to faxes containing advertising
1 38
was reasonable in light of this aim.
In Destination Ventures, the plaintiff was a travel agency that
conducted various travel agent seminars.1 39 Prior to the enactment of
the TCPA, the plaintiff had advertised its seminars via facsimile
machines.1 4 Following the enactment of the TCPA, the travel agency
and other business owners filed a declaratory judgment action
arguing that the TCPA violated the First Amendment.
While the

(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002) (relying on Am. Blast Fax, Inc. in holding that the TCPA
violates the First Amendment).
134 See Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 314 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); see also Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365,
389 (Tex. App. 2004); see also Am. Blast Fax, Inc.,_323 F.3d at 653.
135 See Chair King, 135 S.W.3d at 387. See also Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d
at 659.
136

See Chair King 135 S.W. 2d at 387 (citing Destination Ventures, Ltd. v.

F.C.C., 844 F. Supp. 632, 637 (D. Or. 1994)).
137 See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995).
138

Id.

139 See id. at 55.
140

See id.

141 See

id.
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plaintiffs conceded that the government had a substantial interest in
eliminating advertising cost-shifting, they argued that it was
nevertheless unconstitutional because it was not a "reasonable fit" for
the interest. 142 The court disagreed with the plaintiffs contention,
holding that "because Congress' goal was to prevent the shifting of
advertising costs, limiting its regulations to faxes containing
advertising was justified.", 3 The court noted that the ban is evenhanded in its application as it applies to all commercial enterprises,
and stated that the First Amendment does not require Congress to
a different solution would
reject partial solutions to a problem where
1 44
completely eliminate the cost-shifting.
Courts also hold that the TCPA satisfies the third element of
the Central Hudson test. The Texas appellate court in Chair King
stated that "there is a reasonable fit, no more extensive than necessary
between the TCPA's ban on unsolicited fax advertisements and the
interests directly advanced by the ban."' 145 This statement is echoed
by an Indiana district court, which held that the existence of
alternative 1approaches does not automatically indicate ill-tailored
legislation.
In Kenro, Inc., the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit
alleging that the defendants violated the TCPA by sending a
publication containing unsolicited advertisements. 47 The defendants
leveled a constitutional challenge against the TCPA, setting forth
several specific examples of ways in which the statute could have
been more narrowly tailored.1 48- The court stated that a properly
tailored restriction seeks to eliminate the evils sought to be eradicated
by the government, without simultaneously restricting a substantial
quantity of speech which does not cause the same evils. 4 9 On this
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145

Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 387 (Tex.

App. 2004).
146 Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1168-69 (S.D. Ind.
1997).
147

See id. at 1167.

See id. (stating that the defendants' suggestions included limiting the hours
during which faxes could be sent, requiring reimbursement to the recipients for
actual costs).
148

149

Id. at 1168.
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basis, the Kenro Inc. court disagreed with the defendants' claims of
unconstitutionality, reasoning that the TCPA is not an unqualified
restriction, and that the only restriction it embodies is a prohibition
against the use of facsimile machines to transmit unsolicited
information.' 50 Thus, the court held that the TCPA directly advanced
the governmental interest and was sufficiently narrow to pass
constitutional muster.'51 Congress was under no obligation to pick the
"least restrictive" means available to alleviate the evils caused by fax
blasting because as the court in Florida Bar
52 states, commercial
speech is not afforded that level of protection. 1
The United States Supreme Court in FloridaBar v. Went For
It, Inc. clarified that:
[T]he 'least restrictive means' test has no role in the
commercial speech context. What our decisions
require,.. .is a "fit between the legislature's ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends,' a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope
is "in proportion to the interest served," that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but... a53 means
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.
The Supreme Court explained that if the commercial speech
facing restriction could be communicated through channels other than
the restricted medium, it is more likely that the restriction will be
considered reasonable.' 54 Thus, due to the myriad of alternative
means for advertising-such as television, newspaper, and radio-it
appears unlikely that a First Amendment challenge to the TCPA will
ever be successful.

150

Id.

151Id.
152

Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).

153

See id. (holding that the restriction imposed by the Florida Bar prohibiting

using direct mailings to solicit wrongful death or personal injury claims within a
thirty day period from an accident passed constitutional muster under the Central
Hudson test for restrictions on commercial speech).
154 See id. at 632-34 (noting that the alternative means of advertisement, such
by telephone directory, periodicals, billboards, radio, television, and recorded
messages, sufficiently serve the public interest such that no harm will result from
the ban on unsolicited fax advertising).
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B. Equal Protection Concerns
Additional TCPA constitutional challenges are rooted in the
Equal Protection Clause, and are based on the fact that the Act
separates commercial advertisements from other unsolicited faxes
such as political postings or job openings. 155 In a Senate report prior
to the Act's passage, Congress noted that the damages caused to fax
machines and the impermissible shifting of cost to the consumer was
a government interest protected by the Act. 156 Challengers argue that
the harms caused by TCPA violations result regardless of the
facsimile's content; therefore, they assert that it is unconstitutional to
prohibit advertisements while not banning other types of fax
communications. 157
TCPA challengers contend that strict scrutiny must be used to
analyze the TCPA within the context of the Equal Protection Clause
because the fundamental First Amendment right of freedom of
speech is implicated.1 58 Typically, the courts rejecting the First
Amendment arguments do so because strict scrutiny is not afforded
when the court finds that a party's First Amendment rights have not
been compromised. 59 In the case of the TCPA, these rights have not
been compromised because commercial speech is afforded a lower
level of protection. Therefore, because there is no other fundamental
right implicated and no suspect class involved, the much more lenient
standard of "reasonable fit" applies under the classic Equal Protection
analysis. 160
Analysis under the Equal Protection Clause closely mirrors
the analysis supporting the rejection of First Amendment

155 See

Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 388

(Tex. App. 2004).
156 S. REP. No. 102-178, at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1969.
157

See ChairKing, 135 S.W. 3d at 389.

158 See id. at 388.

9 See id. at 388-89 (citing Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 752
(5th Cir. 1983)). However, it should be noted that if the court's holdings shifted in
favor of finding First Amendment violations under the TCPA it would revive this
constitutional argument as a potential basis for invalidation.
.160 See id. at 389 (stating that "[i]f there is a sufficient "fit" between the
legislature's means and ends to satisfy the concerns of the First Amendment, the
same "fit" is surely adequate under the applicable 'rational basis' equal protection
analysis.").
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challenges. 161 The Supreme Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, explained that if
there is a finding of a sufficient relationship between the valid
governmental interest and the restriction which satisfies the
"reasonable fit" requirements of the First Amendment, the same
relationship is almost necessarily adequate under the applicable
'rational basis' equal protection analysis, due to the analytical
similarities between these Constitutional tests.' 62 Courts that have
performed an equal protection analysis have intertwined the First
Amendment issues into their analysis such that a rejection of the First
Amendment challenges necessitates a rejection of the Equal
Protection challenges.' 63In InternationalScience, the Fourth Circuit
considered a slightly different equal protection challenge. 164 In that
case, the defendants alleged that the Act's jurisdiction provision,
granting state courts exclusive jurisdiction, violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 165 Defendants pointed out that private TCPA
action may be permitted in some state courts and disallowed in others
based on the phrase "if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of a
court of [that] State." 166 The Fourth Circuit addressed this challenge
and held that there was no violation because any inequality that could
exist was a result of statutory authority to "enforce substantive rights
which both state the state and the federal government can enforce in
federal court through other mechanisms."'1 67 Therefore, the court
found there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on
the potential for disparate treatment by different states.
C. Eighth Amendment and Due Process Concerns
The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive
161

See id.

162

Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478

U.S. 328, 344 n. 9 (1986).
163 See Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d365, 388

(Tex. App. Ct. 2004) (rejecting the First Amendment challenge based on the
"reasonable fit" test and applying the same "reasonable fit" test to equal protection
challenges).

Int'l Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Comm. Inc., 106 F.3d 1146,
1156-57 (4th Cir. 1996).
165 See id.
164

166

Id. at 1156.

167 Id.
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fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.168 TCPA challengers argue
that the fines imposed under the TCPA are clearly excessive, as the
potential $1,500 per page liability far outweighs the actual damages
to the recipient of the fax in terms of paper use, ink use, and wear and
tear on the facsimile. 169 However, because the Eighth Amendment is
applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, this analysis is
tied into the second prong of the due process analysis as described
below. There have been two principle due process arguments against
the constitutionality of the TCPA: 1) the statute is unconstitutionally
vague 70 ; and 2) the statute imposes an excessive fine in violation of
due process.
i.

The TCPA is Unconstitutionally Vague

In determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague,
the following standard applies: "a statute which either forbids or
requires doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process law."' 172 In
making this determination, it is important to173determine whether the
speech is protected by the First Amendment.
In Accounting Outsourcing, the plaintiff sued on behalf of
168

See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

169

See Kim v. Sussman, 2004 WL 3135348, at 3 (II. Cir. 2004) (stating that

"[a]ssuming that the 16 or so individual plaintiffs pursue their claims and are each
awarded the minimum $500.00 per violation, it will have cost defendant over
$9,500 for his violation ....Such a sum is clearly sufficient to punish past and
discourage future violations of the Act. On the other hand, certifying a class
threatens to impose on a defendant a virtual automatic liability to thousands of
individuals in a sum that dwarfs the magnitude of harm involved.").
170 See Accounting Outsourcing, LLC, v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commcns.,
L.P., 329 F. Supp. 789, 807 (D. La. 2004).
171See Chair King v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d365, 385
(Tex. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that the advertisers in that matter alleged that the
$500 minimum damage amount violated constitutional due process because it was
so disproportionate the amount of actual harm suffered.).
172 See Accounting Outsourcing, LLC, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (citing Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984) (citing Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391(1926)).
173 See Chair King, 135 S.W.3d at 386-87 (classifying fax advertising as
commercial speech and explaining that "[b]ecause commercial speech occupies a
'subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,"' a reasonable fit test
is appropriate).
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itself and a proposed class of Louisiana residents who alleged that
they received unsolicited facsimiles from at least one of the members
of a large group of defendants. 174 The court held that "because the
TCPA regulates constitutionally protected commercial speech, it
even one
must satisfy a more rigid vagueness test, such that ' 75
vague."'
TCPA
the
render
would
application
impermissible
The argument that the TCPA is unconstitutionally vague has
three main components: 1) the TCPA does not clearly indicate what
conduct is prohibited; 76 2) the TCPA does not clearly indicate its
geographic reach; 177 and
3) the TCPA does not clearly define
78
proscribed facsimiles.1
With respect to the first and third argument, the Accounting
Outsourcing Court held that a person of common intelligence could
understand who the statute applied to "given the FCC's clear and
unequivocal interpretations."' 1 The notion that a facsimile sender
has proper notice that the TCPA applies to them is also inherent in
the plain language of the statute itself. 80 As always, ignorance of the
law is no defense. Additionally, the prohibited conduct itself, i.e. the
sending of an unsolicited facsimile advertisement, is expressed in the
A Louisiana district court in
plain language of the statute.'
Accounting Outsourcing held that the detailed definition of
"unsolicited advertisements" spelled out in the TCPA allows a person
of common and ordinary intelligence to distinguish between
commercial and non-commercial advertisements,
and therefore which
82
faxes are permissible and which are not.'
In responding to the second argument that the geographic
reach of the statute is not clearly indicated, the district court found
174

'
176

See Accounting Outsourcing,LLC, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
Id. at 805.
See id. at 807 (noting specifically the defendants argued that the TCPA is

vague because it does not clearly indicate who is governed by or subject to the
TCPA, i.e. fax broadcasters, advertisers, or "entitled".)
177 See id. at 807 (noting specifically that the defendants argued that the plain
language of the TCPA limits its application to "any person within the United
States").
178 See id. at 804.
Id. at 805.
80 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).

"9

181

See Accounting Outsourcing,LLC, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 805.

182

See id. at 808.
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that "[w]hen considered in the context of the Communications Act as
a whole, persons of common intelligence would know what
geographic scope is covered by the TCPA."'' 83 It discussed the
meaning of the term "within" as used in the statute.' 84 The court
stated that the term needed to be interpreted in its statutory context,
and noted that the TCPA as a whole applied to all interstate and
foreign communications by wire or radio. °5 Therefore, the court held
that the geographic scope was clear
86 and thus that there was no due
1
ground.
that
on
violation
process
ii. The TCPA Imposes an Unconstitutional Penalty
The United States Supreme Court held that a statutory penalty
violates the due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
where "[a] penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be
8 7
wholly disproportional to the offense and obviously unreasonable."'
TCPA challengers argue that the actual cost to the recipient is clearly
disproportionate when compared to the $500
minimum penalty
88
fax.'
unsolicited
an
of
sender
the
by
incurred
In Accounting Outsourcing, the court analyzed whether the
TCPA imposed an unconstitutionally harsh penalty.' 8 9 The court
stated that because the TCPA provides for statutory damages,
defendants cannot complain that they did not have notice regarding
the severity of the possible punishment.' 90 Nevertheless, the
Accounting Outsourcing court still analyzed whether the statutory
penalty violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process guarantee, as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 ' The
court recognized that the standard for judging the constitutionality of
183

Id. at 807.

184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187

St. Louis Iron Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).

188

See Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilenet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365,

385-86 (Tex. App. 2004) (noting the advertisers' assertion that the actual cost of
receiving a fax is two to forty cents, whereas the minimum penalty for sending the
fax is $500.00).
189 See Accounting Outsourcing,LLC, 329 F.Supp.2d at 808-09.
190 Id. at 809.
191 See id.

at 809-10.
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a penalty under due process considerations is modified in situations
where the penalty is meant not only to compensate for private injury,
but also to deter conduct for the public good. 19 2 When deterrence is
one of the purposes, the court has held that 'the legislature may adjust
its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury ....
Congress has specified two legitimate public harms that the TCPA
aims to correct:
(1) these fax advertisements can substantially interfere with
a business or residence because fax machines generally can
handle only one message at a time, to the exclusion of other
messages; and (2) unsolicited fax advertisements unfairly
printing costs to the
shift nearly all of the advertiser's
1 94
recipient of the advertisement.'
Based on these goals and the application of the modified
standard for determining whether there has been a Fourteenth
Amendment violation, courts have consistently held that when
measured against the harms of unsolicited fax advertising and the
public interest in deterring unwelcome conduct, the TCPA's $500
disproportionate to the
minimum damages provision is neither
95
offense nor obviously unreasonable.'

IV. Class Actions
Aside from the issue of liability, there is no issue more critical
to parties in TCPA cases than class certification. The statutory
minimum damages provided for by the TCPA are $500 per
facsimile. 196 Therefore, if a single plaintiff were to sue, the matter
would be appropriate for small claims court. However, if the same
plaintiff is named a representative plaintiff, and is successful in
certifying a class of a few thousand members who received the
facsimile, a $500 liability suddenly turns into a multi-million dollar
192

See id. at 809.

193

Id. (citing St. Louis Iron Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67

(1919)).
H.R. REP. No. 317 (1991). See also Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1162, 1166 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (explaining that the legislative history of TCPA
reveals that Congress was concerned about the costs imposed on the recipient).
194

195 E.g., Kenro, Inc., 962 F.Supp. at 1167; Accounting Outsourcing, LLC, 329
F.Supp.2d at 808-09.
196 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).
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liability. 197 Because of the availability of potentially huge damages
and attorneys fees, class action certification is one of the most
litigated issues in the context of the TCPA.
Class certification is granted under the broad discretion of the
trial court.198 Furthermore:
[W]hen a state court hears a case brought under a federal
law, local laws control procedure, jurisdiction,
administration, and venue. It is often said that 'federal law
takes the state courts as it finds them.. .The particulars of a
TCPA case (jurisdiction, venue, residence, amount in
controversy, etc.) must fit the administrative and
jurisdictional rules of the state court hearing the case. The
Supremacy Clause does not reach these administrative and
procedural issues.. .Congress cannot command which court
is a state has jurisdiction over TCPA claims. Nor can it
mandate the 'modes of procedure'. 199
A. Overlap of the TCPA with Class Action Statutes
The Illinois statute governing class actions applies, because
the private TCPA remedy must be brought in state court, and Erie
principles dictate that the state class action rules apply. 20 0 Thus, to
maintain a valid class action in Illinois, the plaintiff class must show
that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; 2) there are questions of fact or law common to the
class, which common questions predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members; 3) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class; and 4) the class
action is an appropriate method to the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.20'

197 See Craig Anderson, Executive Fights Faxes, One at a Time, Los Angeles

Daily Journal, June 6, 2005, at 4..
198

McCabe v. Burgess, 389 N.E.2d 565. 567 (Ill. 1979).

199 Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc. v. Fax.Corn, Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 327 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (citing Robert R. Biggerstaff, State Court and Telephone Consumer
Protections Act of 1991: Must States Opt-In? Can States Opt-Out?, 33
Conn.L.Rev. 431, 431).
200 See id.
201

See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-801 (2005).
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B. Class Actions in Other Jurisdictions
The California appellate court in Kaufman noted that although
TCPA claims may be brought as class actions, this does not mean
that they should be. 20 2 A Pennsylvania district court stated that "[a]
class action would be inconsistent with the specific and personal
remedy provided by Congress to address the minor nuisance of
unsolicited facsimile advertisements. 2 °3 The court then cited to
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., holding that the denial
of class certification was proper, in the context of the Truth in
Lending Act's minimum award of $100 each for some 130, 0000
class members, as such a result would be a unrelated to any actual
damages and
would result in horrendous consequences against the
20 4
defendants.
Aside from public policy reasons supporting the denial of
certification of a class, there is a separate issue as to whether the
statutory requirements of the state class action statute can be met.
There is much litigation over whether the established business
relationship exception will almost always destroy the commonality
that is an essential element to achieve class certification. 205 As one
court noted in the context of a potential class action TCPA claim, the
"[p]laintiff faces a unique problem because the proposed class
definition flies directly in the face of a basic tenet of class
certification: a court may not inquire into the merits of a case at the
class certification stage."2 06 Furthermore, it noted that "liability arises
only if a transmitted advertisement is unsolicited.,20 7 Due to the EBR
exception, courts must individually determine whether each fax was
solicited in order to ascertain whether the recipient qualifies as a class
member. 208
This becomes important not only with respect to the
commonality requirement of the class action statute, but also as to the

202

Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.

203

Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 405 (E.D. Penn. 1995).

204

See id. (citing Ratner v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412,

416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
205

See id.

206

Id. at 403.

207

See id. at 404.

208

See id.
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209

numerosity" requirement. For example, in Hammond v. Carnett's
Inc., the Georgia appellate court examined a case in which a car wash
company sent out unsolicited facsimiles. 210 The lower court denied
class certification, and the potential class appealed. 21' The Georgia
2
Court of Appeals reversed the denial and certified the class.
Among the arguments made in the lower court was that the EBR
exception destroyed the element of numerosity. 213 The appellate court
failed "to see any connection between the numerosity requirement
of whether Carnett's facsimile advertisements were
and the question
2 14
unsolicited.,

Additionally, in ESI Ergonomic Solutions v. United Artists
Theater Circuit Inc., the Arizona appellate court reversed the trial
court's denial of class certification and stated that the potential
amount of the penalty was not an appropriate consideration 2in
15
determining whether a class action is proper for a particular suit.
The court reasoned that it was not for the court to determine the
fairness of a penalty awarded under a class action statute when
Congress has specifically determined a per violation penalty.216 The
court explained that denial of a class action on the basis of the
incentive for defendant's
amount of the penalty would provide
2 17
violation of the statute on a larger scale.
However, in Livingston v. U.S. Bank Co., the Colorado
209

See Hammond v. Camett's Inc, 596 S.E.2d 729, 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).

210

See id.

211

See id.

212

See id.

213

See id.

214

Id.

See ESI Ergonomic Solutions v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 50 P.
3d 844, 850-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). In ESIErgonomic Solutions, the recipients of
facsimile advertisements sued as class action under the TCPA against defendant
corporations. Id. at 850. The trial court denied the plaintiff's Motion to Certify
and Motion to Reconsider. Id. The plaintiff appealed and the appellate court held
that it was not appropriate for the court to take the possible penalty into
consideration when determining whether the certify the class and that the penalties
were not so oppressive or disproportionate as to deny due process. Id. at 851. The
appellate court thus found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying
the plaintiffs' Motion to Certify and reversed and remanded. Id.
215

216 See id. at 851.

See Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc. v. Fax.Com, Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 328
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing ESI Ergonomic Solutions, 50 P. 3d at 850-851).
217
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appellate court held that denial of class certification was appropriate
for two reasons: 1) the class was not properly identified, and 2) the
individual issues would predominate over the common issues.21 8
C. Class Actions in Illinois
Illinois courts have also specifically addressed whether a class
action suit may be properly maintained in the context of a TCPA
claim brought in state court. 219 In Kim v. Sussman, the plaintiff
alleged violations of the TCPA, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, and
conversion. 220 The plaintiff moved to certify the class, and the court
denied the Motion.22 The trial court stated that "individual issues,
including each individual class member's burden to demonstrate that
the transmission in question was unsolicited, preclude class
certification." 222 It noted that "given the statutory framework of
plaintiff s claims, the Court strongly believes that a class action is not
an appropriate method for the "fair and efficient" adjudication of this
controversy." 223 Furthermore, Illinois courts have held that class
action allegations have been properly dismissed in situations where a
"dual inquiry into each particular transaction involving member of
in order to establish a right of
proposed class would be required
224
member."
class
each
in
recovery
218

See Livingston v. U.S. Bank, 58 P.3d 1088, 1089 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). In

Livingston, recipients of unsolicited facsimile advertisements brought class actions
under the TCPA against Defendant corporations. Id. at 1089. The district court
denied the recipients' class certification motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial on the basis that individual issues predominated over the common issues.
Id. The court specifically noted that because the TCPA did not require permission
in writing, the question of whether consent was given would have to be inquired of
as to each potential class member. Id. at 1090.
219 See Kim v. Sussman, 2004 WL 3135348, at 2 (Ill. Cir. 2004); Livingston v.
U.S. Bank, 58 P.3d at 1089 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Accounting Outsourcing,LLC,
329 F.Supp.2d at 808-09.
220 See id. at 2.
221

See id. at 4.

222

Id. at 2.

223

Id.

224

Arnold v. H. Frank Olds, Inc., 365 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). In

Arnold, the plaintiff brought an action alleging that defendant had charged a service
occupation tax on the retail price of the parts used in their automobiles, instead of
the actual costs. Id. at 615. The plaintiff moved to certify a class on behalf of all
other persons who had their automobiles serviced by defendant, the circuit court
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The court in Kim also discussed at length the general
reasoning behind the denial of class certification. 225 The court stated
that "[t]o engraft on the statutory scheme the possibility of private
class actions, with potential recoveries in the millions of dollars,
strikes the Court as unfair given the nature of the harm Congress
attempted to redress in the TCPA. '226 The court also noted the irony
in the fact that the only feasible way to notify the potential class
members would be to use the same facsimile lists to again send an
unsolicited fax. 227 In considering the unfairness of the damages, the
district court's reasoning is directly contrary to the Arizona appellate
court's statement that the fairness of the damages should not be
considered where Congress has established a minimum penalty.228

Fixing the Problem

V.

A. Impact on Consumers
Proponents of the TCPA argue that the Act itself is aimed at
protecting consumers. 229 They point out that it provides redress for
consumers who have had their private property in the form of paper
and toner converted. 230 It also protects consumers from having their
facsimile lines tied up, and serves to alleviate concerns that an
important facsimile may not be transmitted.23 '
However, the consequences of TCPA enforcement also have
held that the complaint was not legally sufficient to support a class action, and
plaintiff appealed. Id. The appellate court affirmed the denial of class certification
holding that there were two independent determinations that needed to be made as
to each plaintiff: 1) the nature of the particular transaction, and 2) a showing of
unjust enrichment was required for each particular case. Id. at 618.
225 See Kim, 2004 WL 3135348 at 2.
226 Id.
227

See id.

228

See ESI Ergonomic Solutions v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 50 P.

3d 844, 851 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
229

See Jeremiah Marquez, Lawsuits Threaten to Unplug Junk Fax Industry

(Sept. 6, 2003), http://www.detnews.com/2003/technology/0309/07/technology263719.htm. Additionally, the author noted that consumer complaints against
telemarketers increased from app. 1,300 in the beginning of 2002 to 4,100 by the
beginning of 2003. Id.
230 See id.
231

See id.
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negative effects on consumers, namely: 1) deprivation of receiving
the contents of the facsimiles, and 2) residual effects on small
businesses.
The sheer volume of fax blasting transmission 23 2 evidences
the fact that there is at least some market for the service. 233 While
proponents of the TCPA allege that fax blasting is a very inexpensive
medium, it is not free. If these facsimiles were wholly offensive and
undesired, it would not have become a $300 billion industry. From
this data, the argument can be made that some consumers want to
receive some of these faxes, or this would not be such a large
industry. Companies would not continue to fax blast unless they
received positive results.
Additionally, these facsimiles often contain special offers and
coupons to benefit the consumer. They may advertise mom-and-pop
businesses that do not have large advertising budgets. In this era of
big box consumerism, some consumers prefer to patronize family-run
businesses, and facsimile advertising provides a feasible way for
these businesses to advertise. 234 Based on the projected cost of
obtaining express written permission to send these facsimiles, small
businesses may not be able to afford even this type of marketing, and
therefore, all advantages of using this medium would be eliminated.
Perhaps the most devastating effect on consumers is the
destruction of small businesses. As discussed previously, recovery
under class action cases may reach well into the millions.2 35 This
liability, coupled with the current trend in the field of insurance,
whereby insurance companies are denying coverage for 236
TCPA
violations, is enough to completely bankrupt small businesses.
The Congressional findings accompanying the TCPA state that ".... (2)
Over 30,000 business actively telemarket goods and services to business and
residential customers."
233 Additionally, the Congressional findings accompanying the TCPA state
232

that "... .(4) Total United States sales generated through telemarketing amounted to
$435,000,000,000 in 1990, a more than four-fold increase since 1984".
234 See Jeremiah Marquez, Lawsuits Threaten to Unplug Junk Fax Industry
(Sept. 6, 2003), http://www.detnews.com/2003/technology/0309/07/technology263719.htm (quoting Fax.com's attorney's position that the mass-faxing industry
"helps small businesses without deep pockets get their message out.").
235 See Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ga, Ct.
App. 2000) (stating that a $9 million settlement was reached following verdict).
236 See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Capital Assoc. of Jackson County, 392 F.3d 939,
943 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that there is neither a duty to defend nor indemnify a
policyholder for TCPA violations under the terms of a Commercial General
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Ill effects are especially likely for solo practitioners and sole
proprietorships, thus depriving consumers of the opportunity to
utilize these services, as these smaller operations are most likely to
utilize cost-effective fax advertising and less likely to have
comprehensive commercial insurance policies to cover them in the
event of a TCPA violation. Often times, small businesses rely on
third parties to market their goods and services to the public.
However, reliance on third party marketers will not insulate the small
businesses from liability in the event of a TCPA violation, as the Act
imposes strict liability once a violation has been proven. In short,
these owners may lose their family businesses and livelihoods, even
where they did not know about the ban on unsolicited fax advertising.
B. Proposed Solutions
The court's holding in Destination Ventures established a
framework which provides for some flexibility regarding the TCPA's
future. In that case, the court stated that future advances in facsimile
technology might allow for simultaneous transmission or reduce the
consumption of paper, but that these possibilities had no bearing on
their decision as it would be improper for the court to look to the
future.237
However, since the adoption of the TCPA, there have been
advancements in facsimile technology which all lead to one
conclusion: the future is now.2 38 Therefore, based on both the
technological advancements and evolution of case law addressing the
Act, there are now several possible solutions to increase the TCPA's
fairness to protect both small business owners and consumers alike.
i. Eliminate the Possibility of Bringing Private Right of
Action Claims as Class Actions
A class action suit is not an appropriate vehicle for TCPA
Liability Policy).
237 Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54, 57 (9th Cir. 1995).
For example, there now exists technology which allows for simultaneous
transmission of facsimiles, so that one is not "blocked" at the expense of another
being transmitted. Additionally, programs utilized by a large number of businesses
which allow facsimiles to be intercepted from a machine and then transmitted
directly to an e-mail account, thus allowing the e-mail account holder to determine
whether or not they want to open the e-mail or delete it. In theory, this
technological advancement makes opening the contents of the facsimile voluntary,
as well as the choice to use paper and ink/toner to print it.
238
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claims for two reasons: 1) the legislative intent, and 2) the
incorporation of the EBR exception.
Congressional testimony makes it clear that the original
proponents of the bill believed that small claims court was the
appropriate forum for TCPA actions. 239 In fact, the bill's sponsor
alluded to the fact that constitutional restraints prevented him from
directing how states allocate their judicial resources, and, therefore,
that he4 0 could not require claims to be brought in small claims
2
court.

Furthermore, the incorporation of the EBR exception
necessitates individual hearings on the issue of whether each and
every member of the plaintiff class did or did not have an EBR with
the sender. 24 1 Because an EBR may exist as to some members of the
plaintiffs class, there would be no liability to those plaintiffs.242 The
question of whether there is an EBR between the sender and the
recipient is not merely a question of how liable the defendant is to a
class member, instead, it is the very threshold inquiry of the
litigation: is the recipient party actually a class member? If class
actions were eliminated, the potential damages would remain in a
range much more in proportion with the actual damages.
ii. Require Suits be Brought as the Tort of Conversion
Unless Willful and Wanton Behavior can be Proven
Many courts have equated the treatment of TCPA to that of
the torts of conversion or trespass.243 This is an appropriate
comparison under the Congressional cost shifting rationale which
justifies the penalties of the TCPA because of the use of the
recipient's paper and toner, and occupation of their telephone line.
The conversion theory is that the use of such advertising is
tantamount to "advertising by theft."
As such, the same penalties that arise in these torts should be
applicable in TCPA cases. In Illinois, the tort of conversion is
239

See Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc. v. Fax.Com, Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 302

(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
240 Id.

For examples of cases where such hearing were held, see Forman v. Data
Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 405 (E.D. Penn. 1995); see also Kenro, Inc. v. Fax
Daily, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1162, 1169 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
242 See Forman v. Data Transfer, 164 F.R.D. at 404 (E.D. Penn. 1995).
241

243

See Kim v. Sussman, 2004 WL 3135348, at 2 (111.Cir. 2004).
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compensated by actual damages. 244 Illinois courts have held that the
"[m]easure of damages for conversion is fair market value at time of
conversion, and it is plaintiffs burden to show reasonable basis to
determine value of items converted. 245 In addition, Illinois courts
hold that the proper amount of damages for wrongful detention of
chattels is the reasonable value of the use of that chattel during that
period.246
The attempt at determining the amount of actual damages
suffered by the recipient is a much fairer way to determine penalties,
and also serves to protect those who have been truly harmed. This is
especially true under the reasoning of the Crosby court, whereby if
any of the "worst case" scenarios alleged by supporters of the TCPA
were to occur as a result of the occupation of the facsimile lines (i.e.
medical emergencies, lost business opportunities, etc.), plaintiff could
be compensated for these damages as well as long as they could
properly establish a causal connection between the TCPA violation
and their damages.247
iii. Amend the TCPA to Include a Mandatory Joinder
Provision
Much has been said regarding the need to increase judicial
efficiency and preserve judicial resources. Public policy ideals such
as these are shunned by legislation like the TCPA because it allows a
separate suit for each facsimile received, notwithstanding the fact that
multiple facsimiles may have been transmitted between the same
sender and receiver. One problem inherent in allowing a plaintiff to
bring separate suits for each fax is that it allows for forum shopping,
which can be detrimental to the operation of the judicial system. The
danger is especially important to recognize with regard to legislation
as new and dimorphous as the TCPA.
Separate suits make it all too easy for plaintiffs attorneys to
find a judge that rules in the favor of class certification and attempt to

See Ruiz v. Wolf, 621 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); see also, Charles
Selon & Assocs., Inc. v. Aisenberg's Estate, 431 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1981) (holding that the "[g]eneral rule in conversion action is that damages are set
at date of conversion").
245 Ruiz, 621 N.E. 2d at 69.
244

246

See, e.g.,Crosby v. City of Chicago, 298 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ill. App. Ct.

1973).
247

See id.
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file all of the cases with that judge. Forum shopping in this manner is
clearly in opposition to the goal of judicial efficiency. As the statute
allows suits to be brought in any venue where a violation occurs (i.e.
anywhere a recipient resides), plaintiffs will likely have a choice as to
where to file an action. 248 For example, if a certain jurisdiction is
predisposed to granting class certification, plaintiffs will chose to file
as many cases as possible in that jurisdiction instead of a different
jurisdiction where certification is generally denied or the issue is
undecided.
iv. Remove Strict Liability from the Statute
As discussed in the restaurant menu example above, the
TCPA does not include a requirement that the advertised company
have knowledge of the violation. 249 However, there is a knowledge
requirement for liability to be imposed on a common carrier.
Specifically, there must be some showing that the common carrier
was aware that its
communication lines were being used for an
2 51
purpose.
unlawful
The differential treatment of the advertised company versus
the common carrier is not appropriate in light of the fact that, even
with the removal of strict liability from the statute, there would
always still be a defendant - the party that knowingly transmitted the
faxes. Moreover, in most cases, the advertising company's
knowledge would be easy to establish through the contracts entered
into with "fax blasters."
In Illinois, the absence of a knowledge requirement is
particularly troubling, as a violation of the TCPA is a violation of the
Illinois Criminal Code.252 While a petty offense may be one of strict
liability, it is highly uncommon. Under the current law, the mere
stigma that arises from such an offense could be unjustly placed on
one who has no knowledge that a violation of the Act or state statute
has occurred or is about to occur. The removal of the strict liability
component would serve to protect those that are truly innocent, while
not eliminating the plaintiffs chances at recovery from the proper
party-that is, a party who intentionally violated the statute.
248

47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2005).

249

See id.

250

Texas v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc. 121 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1089 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

251

See id.

252

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-3 (2005).
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v. Require an Opt-out provision
Before liability attaches or a violation occurs, a recipient
should have to provide notice that they want to opt-out of the faxes.
This would still provide "victims" with a remedy; if it can be proven
they were contacted again, then liability (even the willful and wanton
standard) could attach.
The rationale behind this proposition is clear: if people are
motivated enough and have the resources to sue, they clearly should
be motivated enough to opt out of the list. This protects the recipients
from unwanted faxes, as well as small business owners from
becoming bankrupt.
vi. Increase the Evidentiary Requirements for Class Actions
The members of the plaintiff class should be required to
present evidence that they retained the facsimile to which they are
objecting instead of merely being allowed to send notice to the
potential class members whose facsimile numbers are obtained off of
a list from the offender.
Requiring this evidence would at the very least provide some
assurance that the plaintiffs were truly "aggrieved." 253 Without this
evidence, defense counsel will naturally argue that because the
plaintiff cannot prove that they received the fax, as a natural
consequence, they cannot prove that they received the fax without
permission. Thus turning the litigation into a "he said-she said"
battle, which wastes the time and resources of the judicial system.

VI. Conclusion
Now let me shoot from the hip. It seems that although
Congress and the FCC were not necessarily panning for gold when
they passed the TCPA, plaintiffs may have a different agenda. As a
caveat, please note that in no way is this article meant to stand for the
proposition that a plaintiff that can properly prove a violation of a
constitutional statute should not be awarded the actual damages that
they incur under the traditional formula of proximate causation.
Instead, it asserts that the Act levies disproportionately harsh
penalties on small businesses. Additionally, the real winners are class
counsel when TCPA classes are certified, who collect huge
paychecks based on their attorneys' fees.
253

See Kim v. Sussman, 2004 WL 3135348, at 2 (Ill. Cir. 2004).
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Junk fax suits have resulted in multi-million dollar verdicts.254
Such verdicts are comparable to verdicts rendered against major
polluters and the tobacco industry. It is difficult to grasp how
unwanted facsimiles are a $2.2 trillion inconvenience when awards
for environmental pollution and wrongful death pale in comparison
and are often reduced when a large verdict has been rendered. With
TCPA plaintiffs seeking damages in excess of tobacco cases,
potential criminal liability under some state statutes, and a "strict
liability" application without a knowledge requirement, the Act has
the potential to devastate small business when compared to the harm
caused by the prohibited conduct.
We need to replace the current system with a system that does
not adopt a "one size fits all" penalty. Rather, the punishment should
fit the crime. Representative Fred Upton put things into perspective at
a hearing of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
the Internet, citing a U.S. Chamber of Commerce survey estimating
that compliance with the "express permission" requirement would
cost business an averafe of $5,000 for the first year and $3,000 per
every subsequent year.
Clearly the harsh and expensive results which may arise from
class action suits have the potential to bankrupt corporations and
small business alike. Moreover, the damages for violations are not
equivalent to the harm caused by the use of paper, nor do the
violations justify, in the case of the Illinois statue, a conviction under
the criminal code.
One of the biggest issues is where the regulations for
commercial advertisements will stop. Currently, there are lawsuits
pending to regulate commercials that are played before movie
features. These lawsuits are brought as class actions seeking an award
of seventy-five dollars per plaintiff. Based on the amount of time the
movie viewer is subjected to the horrible injustice of seeing a
commercial, this is the equivalent of asserting that the average
person's time is worth $300 per hour, making the minimum wage
laws seem oppressive. If plaintiffs could now sue for wasted time and
money expended when "forced" to view advertisements, where does
it end? Will consumers purchasing television services bring class
action suits to end commercials altogether?
254

See Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ga, Ct.

App. 2000).
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As technology constantly evolves and advances, so too will
legislation designed to regulate it. Necessity is the mother of
invention, and as new technologies are invented so will regulations of
the new technologies. Text messages, e-mails, any possible form of
communication which may not yet have been imagined. Indeed, more
regulations are already springing up with the enactment of the federal
CAN-SPAM Act, which requires the FCC to adopt rules to protect
mobile service customers from unwanted text messages.256 The law
must develop and evolve as quickly as technology in order to
effectively govern these burgeoning industries, while still allowing
for some proportional link between the crime and the punishment. If
it does not, as exemplified by the TCPA, more defendants will be
"strung up" by class actions and enormous fines for their advertising
violations.

256 See The CAN-SPAM Act: Requirements for Emailers (Apr. 2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/canspam.htm. The Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7702 (220), et. seq.,
establishes requirements for those who send commercial email, proscribes penalties
for spanmers and companies on whose behalf spain is sent if they violate the law,
and empowers consumers to request that they not be emailed. Id. The law, which
became effective January 1, 2004, covers email whose primary purpose is
advertising a commercial product or service. Id. If an email is between to a
customer with an EBR with the sender, or if the message is used to facilitate a
previously agreed upon transaction, it simply cannot contain false or misleading
routing information, but otherwise is exempt from most provisions of the CANSPAM Act. id

